River Basin Studies

Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Commission (1997)

4-7-1997

Colorado River Basin Study Comments--Lohman, Loretta C., PhD
Loretta C. Lohman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_service_westernwater_rbs

University of New Mexico
UNM Digital Repository
Recommended Citation
Lohman, Loretta C.. "Colorado River Basin Study Comments--Lohman, Loretta C., PhD." (1997).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_service_westernwater_rbs/13

This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open
access by the Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Commission (1997) at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in River Basin Studies by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

APR-17-97 14,37 FROM, NORTHYESTERN SCH LA�

ft·I ■■■•

FAX Transmission

From:

Loretta C. Lohman, PhD

Questions?

Call 303-794-3827
Fax 303-935-8552
Western Water Policy Advisory
Review Commission

3375 W. Aqueduct Avenue
Littleton, CO 80123-2903

P.O. Box 25007, D-5001
April 7, 1997
5:28 PM

Denver, CO 80225-0007

To:
Company:
Address:
Date:
Time:

303-236-4286,303-236-6211

Pages: 6

Message:
Comments on review draft special study, Colorado River Basin.

APR I

1997

I

7 April 1997
To the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission:
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft Colorado River Basin Study for the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission. I know you will be receiving
comments from active water managers, water users, and environmental groups, therefore I
will try to focus on issues that might not arise. As the author of a recently completed
history (awaiting publication) about the conflict between the states and the Federal
government concerning the Colorado River and one who has spent over twenty years
documenting aspects of this conflict I feel I can provide a unique perspective to comments
on this draft paper.
First, I am concerned about the references. Although this document was prepared in an
extremely short time frame and covers a large number of issues, too often statements have
no specific attribution. A search of the source materials must lead one to conclude that
among the primary sources for this draft are two journalists-Philip Fradkin and Marc
Reisner. While most scholars very much enjoy the work of these two, they also agree that
the factual and analytical value does not meet commonly accepted scholarly standards and
that the best use of these two books is as an inspiration for needed research. There are
more appropriate works, starting with Norris Hundley's studies of both the Colorado River
Compact and the Water Treaty with Mexico, that provide a historical context for what has
occurred in the Colorado River Basin and what might be possible remedies. There also
are numerous studies, books, and articles that provide, in my opinion, a more balanced
and dispassionate examination of the Basin than many of the works cited. I will be happy
to provide some suggestions for any revisions.
<,econd, the lack of listed interviews concerns me also. There are hundreds of appropriate
and experienced water managers, state and federal managers, native Americans, and
parties-at-interest who would be available for consultation. It surely is of interest to the
Commission and to the public to know who is stating, alluding, estimating, or postulating
various statements like the "estimated cost of Upper Basin reclamation projects." There
are surely better sources concerning the experimental flood flows through the Grand
Canyon than the New York Times.
These are the two elements that most concern me because it deprives the Commission a
sense of historical context that is necessary to understand how today's arrangements were
reached. The very eloquent introductory paragraphs could demonstrate the conflicts that
have existed since the determination of the national government to settle the West through
various Land Acts from 1841 through 1904 that first determined the size of grants and
later required irrigation to perfect ownership. Those laws coupled with the failure of the
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national government to retain ownership of water created the conflict that exists to this day.
They are not conflicts amenable to remedy.
A review of Hundley's two works would show the reason for two instances of Colorado
River Basin States cooperation. Without the Colorado River Compact the states could not
get the Boulder Canyon Act and begin to develop the river. With the Water Treaty with
Mexico the states' concern was to protect the hard-won development allowed by the
Boulder Canyon project. During the negotiations for the Treaty the states' concern was
justified since Texas obtained extra rights to Rio Grande water in exchange for more
Colorado River water sent to Mexico than that country could then use. The states
reactivated their cooperative tool, the Committee of 14, to deal with the salinity crisis in the
1960s until the Brownell negotiations concluded with the passage of the Salinity Control
Act in 197 4. It took every bit of political energy for the states to force the federal
government to accept the idea that salinity control was a national obligation. The quid pro
quo was the states' acceptance of the Yuma desalting plant wanted by Henry Kissinger
rather than the state proposed alternatives.
The Upper Basin states cooperated in 1947-48 to agree on the Upper Colorado River
Compact. The Impetus for this cooperation was congressional reluctance to allocate funds
to complete the Colorado-Big Thompson Project without an agreement apportioning the
Upper Basin Compact share of river water. Congress was fearful that Wyoming would
again successfully stop a transbasin diversion through litigation. Further, the Upper Basin
Compact opened the door to future development of the river.
There were initially no outside forces behind the cooperative effort of the Interstate
Conference on the Pollution of the Colorado River and Its Tributaries that ran from 1960 to
1972. However, the development of the Lower Basin-Mexico salinity problem in 1961, the
subsequent joint studies, and the tenor of U.S.-Mexico negotiations during the latter part of
the conference combined with the creation of EPA and its new authorities under Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972 to force states' recognition of a potential threat
to resource development. Since 1973 the states have acted together as the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Forum to protect that right. The Forum has been involved in
salinity efforts in both Upper and Lower Basins, in wildlife habitat and mitigation issues, in
endangered species, in water conservation, in ways to treat Indian tribes as separate
entities, in water reuse efforts, and in exploration of managerial and technology innovations
for water management and water quality-in other words, the Forum work touches just
about every issue mentioned in the document under review.
In each of these instances the seven Colorado River Basin States cooperated and worked
hard together to achieve some desired outcome. That is a historical lesson important to
any discussion of future needs and management changes. Changing social and cultural
values have been the impetus to cooperation only in that threats to state determination of
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resource use and development have required it. Acceptance of changing values has
occurred and continues to occur, albeit at a slower pace than some would like.
The omission of historical context extends throughout most of the document. For example,
the Law of the River is constantly mentioned but without any full and clear explanation. In
this case the omission of Figures and Appendices is a severe handicap to any reviewer,
although one should not assume that all or even many readers to examine either closely.
It also would be useful to note some of the inherent contradictions in national
policy-making concerning the Colorado River. The present Secretary of the Interior, when
Governor of Arizona enthusiastically supported construction of the Central Arizona Project
and its administrative conditions. He also zealously sought continued funding for
construction of the Yuma desalting plant based on national obligation and commitment to
Mexico. Others currently involved in Colorado River matters have vastly different roles
and positions than they once advocated. This shows not just changing times but the very
continuing complexity of the issues and the unreliability of imposed solutions.
Governments change at all levels and commitments made by one administration or
congress can be undone by another.
This brief historical context should explain why the statement "The basin states and
Secretary of the Interior should agree on and formalize a cooperative management
structure for the basin to address and resolve major water management issues affecting
the public interest" is overly sanguine. River basin organizing has not been successful
except in addressing discrete and well-defined problems. The fate of the Missouri River
Basin Commission comes to mind.
Water reuse and conservation are two other areas that I feel competent to discuss. First
let me mention the discussion of Tucson's referendum not to use CAP water (p. 71 ). The
damage in Tucson was to those sections of the city with plumbing system well more than
50 years old. A mitigation program would have been completed by this time had emotions
not been inflamed. This is one instance when science (p. 65) was overwhelmed by
emotion. This bears directly on the issue of water reuse. Tucson has a well-established
nonpotable reuse program for golf course, mecfian, and other landscape irrigation. This
element applies in Southern California where reuse has been constrained more by
overly-conservative state health department rules than by any cost or public acceptance
factors. Most of the reuse cited in the document tallies small successes. The acceptance
of reuse is a problem of both funding and professional attitudes now complicated by an
increasingly litigious society. It is naturally expensive to institute large scale nonpotable
water reuse programs because such efforts generally require construction of another
distribution system. Once the health regulators establish workable rules and the water
managers accept the idea of reuse there remains the problem of funding. Part of the
answer awaits the answer to the question of who benefits and who pays. Reuse is not an
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easy palliative to water supply problems because of cost and regulation and, if anywhere
but at the "end of the pipeline," with the water supply of downstream users.
Conservation as an ethic is, I believe, a worthy goal. However it often conflicts with state
water law and with the water supplies of other users. Water conserved by agriculture
currently brings no benefit to the conservator. Achieving that conservation is expensive
and not likely to be undertaken without some reward. It is not the low price of agricultural
water that is the barrier (p.55). It is the high cost of conservation measures and the low
return on farm production. Domestic conservation does have rewards. It expands potable
water supplies and reduces water bills. Again, it may require intensive investment by the
water supplier that will only be worthwhile if potable water supplies are expanded or
extended. Otherwise a situation might occur where water conservation reduces water
sales to the extent that the supplying utility might have financial difficulty and be forced to
increase rates, thus removing the reward for conserving.
Small points:
• The statement that "NAFTA has raised the promise of environmental
action on this part of the border" (p. 64) strikes me as naive at best.
• The Ak-Chln Indians not only were early beneficiaries in water rights
settlement (p. 79), they were beneficiaries of a substantial Small Project Loan
from Reclamation to develop irrigated agriculture. The loan was, by policy,
forgiven and the Ak-Chin have mostly sold or leased their water. Such double
arrangements probably go beyond the moral commitment to honor past
promises.
• The statement (p. 85) that the states oppose interstate leasing of Indian
water rights ''for the simple reason that non-Indian interests can now use this
water without paying for it" is simplistic. Many states prohibit the interstate
marketing of water, which is why Colorado did not accept the "Galloway"
proposal, which was not Indian water. One of the points of controversy within
and among the Upper Basin states is the feeling that the Lower Basin has
been getting free water because there are insufficient storage facilities in the
Upper Basin. This is an equity question that will need addressing in any
"re-managing" of the river.
• The Salton Sea (p. 5) was not created when the Colorado River broke its
channel in 1905 and flowed into the Imperial Valley. Rather it is a natural sink
that was filled by the river flow and remains filled by irrigation return flow.
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